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Abstract
The residential UK electricity market was opened for the first time in 1999, introducing 
choice of supplier, and about 40% of households changed supplier in the first four years.  
After three years price caps were removed.  We review this process and assess the 
competitiveness of the market by examining how the charges levied by suppliers depend on 
cost and demand factors for three different payment methods and consumption levels.  We 
also identify signs of additional market power of incumbency and the effect of levying a tariff 
with no fixed charge.  We find that both cost and demand factors affect charges, and the 
relationship varies for different payment methods and consumption levels; and that tariffs 
with no fixed element have different effects for different payment methods.  We also conclude 
that considerable market power seems to remain with potentially adverse distributional 
effects. 
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1. Introduction and Background  
This paper investigates the final prices charged to residential consumers in the UK for electricity, 
one of the basic utilities, on the date when the final price constraints were removed from these 
tariffs in April 2002. The regulator believed that there was sufficient competition to move from ex 
ante price regulation to ex post review of behaviour and has since claimed that prices today are set 
by competitive forces (Ofgem, 2003a, p.53).  We examine the charges made in these markets and 
their relation to costs and other market characteristics as an indication of how developed the 
competitive process was at that time.   
The energy regulator has both a role to promote choice and value for all consumers (Ofgem 
website, 2003b) and a duty to take account of the interests of low income consumers (Utilities Act, 
2000).   As for all necessities, low income groups spend a higher than average proportion of their 
income on utilities, but consume a lower absolute quantity of energy than those who are richer.  
Prices for different consumption levels and payment methods therefore also have important and 
politically sensitive distributional consequences, witnessed by a history of political intervention in 
nationalised industry tariffs, and a combination of government and regulatory influence in their 
privatised successors.   
The electricity supply industry is vertically divided into four stages: generation; high voltage, long 
distance transmission; regional distribution; and the retail function (sales and billing).  At 
privatisation the distribution and retail functions were jointly vested in fourteen regional companies, 
but these functions have recently been divided into separate organisations and have subsequently 
devolved to different owners in many regions.  A company retailing electricity pays charges to the 
three upstream providers, i.e. to a generator for the energy, to National Grid Transco for 
 3
transmission through the network, and to a distribution company for local transport (the supply 
company may be vertically integrated with either a distribution or a generation provider, or both).  
The retail function itself is primarily procurement of energy, and meter reading, billing and 
collection of payment.    
Costs of retailing depend on payment method.  The three payment methods are standard credit 
(payment in arrears after receipt of a quarterly bill); direct debit (monthly amounts deducted directly 
from a consumer s bank account); and prepayment, where supply is activated by insertion in the 
meter of a precharged smart card or key.   Automated direct debit is the cheapest for the retail 
company to operate, and prepayment the most expensive because of the cost of handling frequent 
small cash transactions.  In addition, prepayment sometimes incurs an additional distribution charge 
for the retailer.    
When the retail part of energy markets was first opened to competition (from 1998 for households) 
most commentators predicted that prices would become more cost reflective. The nationalised area 
boards, predecessors to the regional electricity companies, had interpreted their public service 
obligations by implementing widespread cross-subsidies through average cost pricing. This meant 
that consumers with high costs (those living in rural areas, consuming at times of peak demand, 
paying late or using more expensive prepayment meters) were subsidised by those with lower costs.  
Once the retail market was separated from distribution, the cross-subsidies in the retail sector would 
be eroded (see Waddams Price and Hancock, 1998).  This has occurred most obviously for payment 
method in energy.  Meanwhile cross-subsidy has persisted for rural consumers, through averaging 
charges to rural and urban areas for distribution, which remains a monopoly.  
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Following the introduction of competition to all parts of the retail electricity market in May 1999, 
price constraints were removed from the direct debit market in April 2000, but prices charged to 
standard credit and prepayment consumers by incumbents in their home market remained capped 
until April 2002, as did the difference between the charges made for these two payment methods.  
This restriction varies between regions, and is discussed further when we report our results.    
The regulator, Ofgem, has undertaken periodic reviews of the development of the market both 
before and after the removal of price regulation.  In December 2002 (Ofgem, 2002) an analysis at 
aggregate level showed that the gap between incumbent and entrant prices in the residential 
electricity market was, if anything, widening, and that the best offers below the incumbent s price 
varied from 7 to 17%.  Another report, six months later (Ofgem, 2003a), extended the discussion to 
savings at different consumption levels, as does our analysis, showing lower percentage discounts 
and opportunities to save from switching away from the incumbent at lower consumption levels.  
Our paper tests Ofgem s assertion that prices are set by competitive forces by assessing the relation 
between prices and costs at a much more disaggregated level, analysing the individual charges 
levied by each brand and in each region, and relating these to a variety of cost and demand factors 
at different consumption levels.    
This analysis enables us to assess the extent of general market power in the retail market by 
examining how far charges are determined by  different cost and market factors.  If the retail sector 
is strongly competitive we would expect cost factors to predominate, with upstream costs largely 
passed through 100% in the long run.  Any oligopoly power in this increasingly concentrated sector 
would be indicated by demand factors having a significant effect on prices; while market power of 
the incumbent over and above such generalised oligopoly power, might be captured by higher 
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charges levied by incumbents.  However, as we indicate in our discussion, there may be other 
interpretations in such a newly opened market.  
In the next section we describe the data.  Section 3 presents the methodology, section 4 the results 
and section 5 a concluding discussion. 
2. Data   
The companies whose charges we examine are the surviving electricity incumbents and some new 
entrants to the industry.  Not all companies operate in all regions, but there were seven former 
Public Electricity Suppliers operating nationwide, using thirteen brand names.  The other four 
brands are entrants to the market, by far the largest of which, British Gas, is the incumbent in the 
gas market.   The fourteen regions are those in England, Scotland and Wales which were formerly 
defined by Public Electricity Suppliers.  The most common tariff is one with a standing charge 
which is independent of the consumption level, and a single rate for each unit consumed.  We have 
also included tariffs with no standing charge, but with a high unit charge for the first few units, and 
tariffs with a standing charge and two running rates, and have tested whether such multipart tariffs  
generally result in higher or lower charges for each payment method and consumption level.    
We use as the dependent variable the charges levied to consumers at three levels of annual demand: 
1650, 3300 and 4950 kilowatt hours (kWh), defined as low, medium and high levels of residential 
consumption by energywatch, the consumer body for the industry.  We account for differences in 
tariff structure by including a dummy variable when there is a virtual standing charge, i.e. a zero 
or very small charge at nil consumption, and higher per unit charges for the first few units used.  On 
the cost side we include the two charges which retailers pay which we can calculate from known 
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tariffs, the distribution and transmission charges.   Distribution costs form 25-30% of the final bill 
and vary across regions according to the charges levied by the local distribution company, but are 
levied equally on all suppliers using that distribution network.  Distribution charges are generally in 
the form of a two part tariff, a charge per consumer and a charge per unit of electricity carried, and 
are usually higher for prepayment than for other consumers (see above for definition of payment 
methods).  Transmission costs account for about 10% of residential final bills and vary by region.  
Retailers must also pay for the energy which they supply, but costs for individual retailers are 
confidential.  However some indication of whether these costs are higher or lower than those 
incurred by others might be inferred from whether the company is generally charging more or less 
than average across the markets, once all the other factors have been taken into account.  
The fourteen areas effectively constitute distinct markets (resale of electricity is impractical and 
usually illegal); we include characteristics of these markets, viz. the total number of consumers in 
the region supplied by all companies, the average income in that region and the geographical area 
covered.  These identifiable characteristics of different regions enable us to interpret separately the 
effect on charges of costs and the market in each region, rather than capture all characteristics 
together in a single aggregate regional dummy.  We allow for brand dummies which will capture 
any supplier specific factors which are reflected in tariffs (including costs of purchasing electricity), 
and test for significant differences between brands which are owned by the same company.  In 
addition we include a dummy to represent incumbency, to capture the effects of incumbent market 
power.  We estimated nine regressions, one for each payment method and consumption level, 
relating retail charges to the cost elements which we could identify, to these market characteristics 
and to brand and incumbency.    
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We have 456 sets of pricing data relating to 14 regions, 17 brand names, three payment methods 
and three levels of consumption.  The pricing data are from the energywatch website.  Transmission 
charges are from the National Grid Transco web site (National Grid Transco, 2002), and are those 
levied during the period 16:00 hours to 19:00 hours.  Distribution charges for use of the system are 
published by the Electricity Association (Electricity Association, 2002).  We use the total annual 
charge levied for a typical domestic customer at each level of demand and payment method.  
Figures for both distribution and transmission charges were for the year 2002, the year for which 
our retail prices apply.  Descriptive statistics are shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics   
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Total charge p/ annum for standard credit     
  1650 kWh  13948 1088 11464 16871 
  3300 kWh  23558 1721 20043 28460 
  4950 kWh  33155 2530 28441 40472 
Total charge p/ annum for direct debit       
  1650 kWh  13158 1169 10594 16578 
  3300 kWh  22493 1792 18993 27127 
  4950 kWh  31812 2598 27312 38792 
Total charge p/ annum for prepayment     
  1650 kWh  16191 1676 12210 21936 
  3300 kWh  26734 2102 23031 31671 
  4950 kWh  37277 2833 31951 42231 
    
Distribution charge p/annum, non prepayment 
  1650 kWh pa 3642 667 2603 5163 
  3300 kWh pa 5788 1096 4163 8100 
  4950 kWh pa 7934 1643 5598 11037 
Distribution charge p/annum for prepayment      
  1650 kWh pa 4779 1151 3202 6663 
  3300 kWh pa 6996 1418 5156 9600 
  4950 kWh pa 9212 1834 7109 12537 
Transmission charge p/ annum     
  1650 kWh  1878 779 293 3296 
  3300 kWh  3756 1559 587 6593 
  4950 kWh  5635 2339 881 9890 
Distribution customers, 000  1804 663 592 3261 
Size of distribution area, sq kms   16028 11405 665 54390 
Average gross income/head, £pa : 15232 1959 12743 20300 
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3. Methodology   
The model can be written as follows for each payment type and consumption level, for supplier j in 
region i 
ijijjijiiiiiij VSincYcustareaDCTCB 987654321 
where 
Bij= the bill charged in region i by supplier j 
TCi is the transmission charge in region i 
DCi is the distribution charge in region i 
areai is the geographic area of region i 
custi is the total  number of residential customers (all payment types) in region i 
Yi is the average income of region i 
incij takes the value 1 if j is the incumbent in area i, 0; otherwise 
Sj takes the value 1 for j s charges; 0 otherwise 
Vij takes the value 1 if there is more than one unit charge (i.e. there is a virtual standing charge); 0 
otherwise. 
If the market is competitive and in equilibrium we would expect variations in costs across regions to 
be closely reflected in tariff variations, i.e. 2 and 3  to be close to 1.  The area which the 
geographical market covers might affect the costs of marketing, and would be indicated by a 
positive value for 4 if marketing over a greater area were more expensive.  In contrast, the size of 
the market as measured by the total number of consumers in that distribution area and the average 
income of consumers are market characteristics which are unlikely to affect costs and would have 
little effect if the market were truly competitive, in which case 5 and 6 might not be expected to 
be significantly different from zero; the size of the total market may also indicate the size served by 
any one supplier, and so potential economies of scale and cost factors.  Conversely, if companies 
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are targeting larger markets, or those with higher income, and have some market power, 5 and 6  
would be negative.  The prepayment market caters for lower income consumers than other tariffs, 
and so the relationship between prices and costs might be different.  Additional power of 
incumbents, who had retained a market share of between 50% and 85%, would be reflected in 
higher tariffs, and a positive coefficient for the incumbency dummy.    
We test for the ability of firms to differentiate this essentially homogeneous product by examining 
the significance of brand dummies.  Whether a non zero brand dummy reflects mostly cost 
differences or mostly market power is assessed partly through consistency in the sign of the brand 
dummy and partly by comparing the dummy signs of brands owned by the same company and 
operating under different brand names in different regions.    
We would expect the existence of a virtual standing charge (i.e. one that is very low or zero) to 
decrease charges at low levels of consumption, where few (higher priced) units have been 
consumed; and to increase them at high consumption levels, as companies try to recoup revenue 
which may have been lost for consumers of small amounts of electricity.  We expect the tariffs for a 
given supplier in a particular region to be correlated across the three payment methods, and this 
affects the methodology used.  We ran a least squares regression for each payment method 
separately and investigated the correlation between the estimated residuals of the three equations.  
The correlation coefficient between the residuals of the standard credit and direct debit equations is 
high and significant at 1% (0.961 at 1650kWh, 0.889 at 3300kWh and 0.915 at 4950kWh).  
However, between these two equations and the prepayment equation the coefficients are small and 
not significantly different from zero.  This suggests that the prepayment market is very different 
from those with other forms of payment, consistent with results of earlier studies showing that 
consumers value the control which prepayment gives them, in addition to the commodity of 
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electricity itself (see for example Cook et al., 2001).  These results suggest we estimate a 2-
equations seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) model for standard and direct debit 
tariffs at all consumption levels, with the prepayment equation estimated separately.   
The estimated residual in the prepayment equation has a variance well above that in the other two 
equations, while the residual variances of standard and direct debit are very close to each other. 
Before estimating the SURE we tested for conditional heteroskedasticity within each equation.  
Indeed there is a possibility of non-constant residual variance within each equation as a result of the 
spatial dimension of our data. Because we don t know the structure of this heteroskedasticity, we 
employ the well-known White s (1980) test for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. We did not 
reject homoskedasticity in any equation at the 5% level of significance.  Since this is also a general 
test for model misspecification, the results support the linear model specification for these 
equations.  In the non parsimonious model we chose British Gas as the reference company since it 
is the major non incumbent player.  To derive the parsimonious version, reported in tables two to 
four, companies were eliminated through a stepwise regression in each equation before estimating 
the pooled sample regression involving standard and direct debit tariffs only.  It is this group of 
excluded companies which forms the base case for the parsimonious version.    
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4. Results  
Table 2. Parsimonious SURE results for Standard Credit; Dependent variable: annual bill  
annual consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh 4950 kWh 
Constant ***
(405.23)
10351.14 ***
(454.18)
16808.90 ***
(659.67)
25585.55 
Virtual Standing Charge 
dummy   
***
(109.87)
532.81 
Distribution charge ***
(.071)
.90 ***
(.053)
.971 ***
(.057)
.862 
Transmission Charge ***
(.049)
.394 ***
(.028)
.275 ***
(.030)
.252 
Distribution area   ***
(.003)
.015 ***
(.004)
.016 ***
(.006)
.018 
Distribution customers ***
(.075)
.421- ***
(.091)
.423- ***
(.141)
.630- 
Incumbent  ***
(134.57)
526.82 ***
(153.24)
1883.64 ***
(235.40)
2989.84 
Suppliers    
Amerada  ***
(85.02)
461.10 
Atlantic  ***
(237.38)
660.37- 
Basic Power **
(141.43)
343.50 ***
(120.71)
1771.36- 
London ***
(135.50)
704.41- ***
(116.27)
702.54- 
Northern ***
(489.07)
1384.02 ***
(556.00)
1464.23 
Npower  ***
(253.67)
1485.00- 
Powergen  ***
(149.43)
932.74 ***
(236.35)
1001.03 
Scottish Hydro  ***
(387.16)
1254.82 ***
(614.35)
1222.64 
Southern ***
(62.36)
413.10- 
Scottish Power ***
(135.34)
530.34 ***
(86.54)
541.86 
TXU  ***
(164.24)
721.58 ***
(236.51)
1394.18 
British Gas ***
(67.75)
358.41 
Adj. 2R .831 .917 .901 
               Notes: standard errors in parentheses. **. Significant at 5%. ***. Significant at 1%. 
 12
Table 3. Parsimonious SURE results for Direct Debit; Dependent variable: annual bill  
annual consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh  4950kWh  
Constant ***
(399.15)
9297.66 ***
(450.27)
15838.97 ***
(668.10)
23963.92 
Virtual Standing Charge 
dummy 
***
(52.95)
347.45  ***
(110.16)
484.18 ***
(86.56)
769.38 
Distribution charge ***
(.070)
.907 ***
(.053)
.971 ***
(.058)
.856 
Transmission Charge ***
(.048)
.383 ***
(.028)
.269 ***
(.030)
.234 
Distribution area   ***
(.003)
.016 ***
(.004)
.018 ***
(.006)
.019 
Distribution customers  ***
(.074)
.422- ***
(.090)
.410- ***
(.143)
.655- 
Incumbent  ***
(133.71)
819.15 ***
(153.56)
2166.86 ***
(240.06)
3506.98 
Suppliers    
Atlantic  ***
(84.67)
1015.65- ***
(240.88)
1608.45- 
Basic Power ***
(140.25)
1396.93 ***
(89.37)
927.05 
London ***
(134.56)
728.22- *
(86.22)
153.34- 
Manweb ***
(196.35)
980.66 ***
(275.09)
820.59 ***
(393.15)
1223.72 
Northern ***
(484.28)
1777.22 ***
(551.00)
2153.23 
Npower ***
(60.07)
615.81 ***
(257.48)
667.33- 
SEEBOARD **
(68.09)
163.41- 
Powergen  ***
(149.00)
792.96 ***
(239.91)
1721.65 
Scottish Hydro ***
(140.06)
548.56 ***
(383.53)
1138.98 ***
(623.36)
1413.46 
Scottish Power ***
(134.41)
616.65 
TXU  ***
(162.57)
513.51 ***
(244.40)
796.44 
Adj. 2R .853 .923 .904 
               Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *. Significant at 10%. **. Significant at 5%. ***. Significant at 1%.   
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Table 4. Parsimonious SURE results for Prepayment; Dependent variable: annual bill  
annual consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh 4950kWh  
Constant ***
(330.97)
18256.48 ***
(724.55)
26564.48 ***
(939.80)
35639.14 
Virtual Standing Charge 
dummy 
***
(305.28)
1095.60-  ***
(404.29)
2246.59- 
Distribution charge  ***
(.07)
.326 ***
(.073)
.463 
Transmission Charge   
Distribution area **
(.008)
.016-  
Distribution customers ***
(.138)
1.09- ***
(.162)
1.160- ***
(.203)
1.256- 
Incumbent     
Suppliers   
Amerada ***
(305.28)
2201.75 ***
(338.84)
3458.31 ***
(404.29)
4577.04 
Basic Power  ***
(362.72)
1427.37- ***
(432.59)
3442.09- 
London   **
(417.81)
835.25- 
Npower ***
(326.95)
2671.31 ***
(362.44)
1225.58 
Powergen ***
(305.28)
1379.71- ***
(338.84)
1865.18- ***
(404.29)
2548.48- 
British Gas (BG)  ***
(338.84)
1602.18- 
Adj. 2R .593 .687 .755 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses.  **. Significant at 5%. ***. Significant at 1%.   
The results are shown in tables 2 to 4.  In the parsimonious equations, three brands act as the base 
group across all equations, namely SWALEC, SWEB and Yorkshire, all regional incumbents 
offering tariffs only in their local areas, and owned by companies operating under other brand 
names elsewhere.  For each consumption level and payment method we see that other brands, 
without dummy coefficients significantly different from zero, are indistinguishable from this base 
group.  For standard credit these are SEEBOARD and Manweb; and for Direct Debit, British Gas, 
Amerada and Southern.  In the prepayment market there is a much larger reference group whose 
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charges are indistinguishable from each other and the reference group, once other factors have been 
taken into account, including Atlantic, Manweb, Northern, SEEBOARD, Scottish Power, Scottish 
Hydro and TXU.   These last two are particularly interesting because the extra charges they were 
allowed to levy for prepayment rather than credit consumers in their home region was smaller than 
for other incumbents.  Both credit and prepayment tariffs had been regulated immediately prior to 
the date these charges were levied, while direct debit tariffs had been deregulated previously.  In 
particular, the difference between charges made by incumbents to the prepayment and credit 
markets was capped at £15 in all regions, but with a lower difference imposed on the Eastern and 
Scottish Hydro regions (£11.22 and 0 respectively).  Our results indicate that this has translated into 
higher charges by TXU and Scottish Hydro in the credit market, rather than to lower charges for 
prepayment consumers, for whose protection these restrictions were designed. The similarity 
between the direct debit and standard credit models, and their difference from that for prepayment, 
is even more remarkable in the light of the regulatory experience outlined above, and reflects long 
term historical differences as well as informal political pressure to reduce charges in the prepayment 
market.      
The constant in each equation can be regarded in some sense as the base charge for the generation 
and retail services of a company in the reference group if it were not incumbent, and without any 
allowance for the area and number of customers.  As expected, this increases for higher 
consumption within each payment method and for each consumption level is highest for 
prepayment and lowest for direct debit payment, reflecting our expectations about the relative costs 
of supplying different consumption levels and payment methods.    
On the cost side we see that at all levels of consumption, distribution and transmission charges have 
a positive coefficient for standard credit and direct debit payment.  Distribution costs are passed 
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through virtually 100% (few of the coefficients are significantly different from unity at 5% 
significance).  The lower coefficient for transmission charges, around one third, is consistent with 
their reflection of charges for the three evening hours from 16:00 to 19:00 hours.  These are the 
peak hours for residential consumption, and if around a third of consumption takes place at this 
period1, this would again indicate close to 100% pass through of costs in these markets.  The 
exception is the prepayment market, where the coefficient for distribution charges is much lower, 
and not significantly different from zero at low consumption levels; and transmission charge 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero at any of the consumption levels.  The 
disassociation between costs and charges in this market suggests it is much further from being 
competitive than for the other two payment methods.    
Costs may also differ with the area covered by a distribution market, a negative coefficient 
indicating economies of size,  and a  positive coefficient  suggesting higher costs if there is  a  larger  
area to cover, most likely in marketing.  We see positive coefficients for standard credit and direct 
payment, suggesting some diseconomies of area, with very similar coefficients for these two 
payment methods at all consumption levels.  But geographic area has no effect on prepayment 
charges except at low consumption levels where the effect is negative, suggesting either that there 
are no higher costs for these consumers associated with larger areas (reflecting the much lower level 
of marketing activity to this group) or that such costs are not passed on in charges.  Either 
interpretation suggests less intense competition in this market.  
In terms of market characteristics, we see that lower charges are associated with larger markets as 
measured by numbers in the distribution region.  To the extent that each supplier would generally 
have more consumers in a larger total market, this may reflect some economies of scale for each 
                                                          
1
 This assumption seems reasonable, though we have not been able to verify it. 
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operator within a market; but it may also reflect market power.  At each consumption level we see 
that the coefficient for prepayment consumers is twice as high as that for the other two tariffs, again 
suggesting that any market power is higher.  However the average income in each market did not 
affect charges at any consumption level or payment type.    
For both credit and direct debit the incumbency coefficient is positive, suggesting additional 
charges of between 4% and 13% levied by the incumbent when other factors are taken into account.  
This is a little lower than the best offers table in the 2002 Ofgem report, because our analysis 
identifies a broader range of factors affecting charges.  The mark up varies between these two 
payment methods in an interesting way.  At all consumption levels it is highest for direct debit 
consumers, where net consumer switching has been greatest, 46% in January 2003, the latest date 
for which such detailed figures are available (Ofgem, 2003a).  One interpretation is that the mark up 
is a disequilibrium phenomenon which reflects competition from entrants undercutting the 
incumbent, rather than an equilibrium level of relative prices, which would indicate incumbent 
power.  Such an interpretation is supported by the zero incumbency coefficient for prepayment, 
perhaps reflecting the lower level of interest from entrants in this market, rather than an equilibrium 
competitive price.   
Alternatively, the failure of incumbents to lower their prices to meet competition could be 
interpreted as exercising market power over their captive incumbent customers.  It may be 
profitable for them to maintain prices above those of entrants, because the marginal losses in 
revenue from lowering price to non switchers exceeds the marginal gain from losing fewer 
customers to entrants (see Giulietti et al., 2003).   Companies are confronted by this trade off 
because they are constrained to charge all customers according to their published tariff.   
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While electricity is essentially a homogeneous product, companies make great efforts to 
differentiate their services, and we explored whether the price relationship varies between brands, 
apart from incumbency.  The brand dummies will partly reflect differences in the unknown (to us) 
generation costs, and partly differences in pricing strategy, to the extent that market power enables 
these to be implemented through price differences.  Coefficients of the same sign for all payment 
methods and consumption levels would suggest that generation cost differences are the predominant 
factor, particularly where they are also similar across brands in common ownership.  Where they 
vary across markets for brands and companies this is more likely to indicate different strategies in 
different markets, as compared with the reference group.     
First we examined similarities of coefficients within each brand name across all the markets which 
that brand serves.  While nine of the brands outside the reference group reveal consistent 
differences in sign from the reference group, this is not so for the three largest national suppliers, 
namely Powergen, Npower and British Gas; nor for SEEBOARD and one of the smaller entrants, 
Basic Power.  For each of these five brands, charges to some markets are significantly higher and in 
others significantly lower than for the base group, after allowing for general cost and market 
influences.  We therefore deduce that the differences are at least in part related to company attempts 
to target different markets, and not merely reflective of different generation costs.  
Across the market as a whole the model identifies more brand differentiation for standard credit and 
direct debit than for prepayment, with more brand dummies significantly different from the base 
group for these payment methods than for prepayment.  Of the incumbent brands with wide 
coverage who are not in the base group, London charges less (or similar) in all markets, and 
Scottish Power, Scottish Hydro and TXU charge more or the same.  Npower charges more to 
consumers of small quantities, and less to large consumers in standard credit and direct debit 
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markets; while Powergen charges more to credit and direct debit customers and less to prepayment 
customers.  All these variations suggest some market power across markets, with differential 
approaches to each market by different companies.   
Table 5 shows the ownership pattern for different brands.  Insofar as differences in these dummies 
reflect different costs of electricity purchase, we would expect these to be similar both across brand 
names and between different brand names within the same ownership group.  There seems to be 
some weak support for this, even though the base group itself includes members from three 
different consolidated groups.  Amongst the other ownership groups, Manweb and Scottish Power 
both have higher charges; and the Npower group, which includes Northern and Yorkshire, makes 
higher charges to some markets and lower to others than the base group.  We conclude that there is 
sufficient variety both within brands and within ownership groups to suggest that at least some of 
the price difference is related to market strategies, indicating an attempt to differentiate brands and 
suggesting the presence and exercise of market power.    
Table 5: Electricity supply brand names within the same ownership group 
Group 
Identity   
A London, SWEB, SEEBOARD* 
B Manweb, Scottish Power 
C Northern, Npower (incumbent in Midlands), Yorkshire 
D Scottish Hydro, Southern, SWALEC 
E PowerGen (incumbent in East Midlands), TXU* (incumbent in Eastern and 
Norweb regions) 
* acquired after April 2002, when the data analysed here were gathered; source Electricity 
Association  (2003)   
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Comparisons of tariff differences with the percentage of consumers who have switched away from 
the incumbent suppliers is complicated by the particular characteristics of the Scottish market, 
where competition has been much slower to develop, particularly in the Scottish Hydro region in 
the north of the country.  To some extent the higher charges by the two Scottish companies may 
partly be a reflection of greater residual incumbent power because of this delay.  The most 
successful entrant into the market is British Gas, which makes lower charges to medium sized 
prepayment and higher charges to low volume standard credit consumers.   Other entrants 
(Amerada, Atlantic and Basic Power) all show some differences across markets.  Basic Power is 
cheaper for some standard credit and prepayment consumers, but more expensive for direct debit; 
while Atlantic is cheaper for both credit tariffs, and Amerada is more expensive for prepayment and 
some credit users, suggesting selective targeting by niche suppliers.    
Finally we examined the effect of having a reduced standing charge, but a higher running rate for 
the first few units.  A small or absent standing charge tended to raise prices for all direct debit 
payers and medium consumption standard credit users; but it had no effect on users of small or 
large amounts of electricity paying by standard credit, and decreased the price, relative to more 
traditional two part tariffs, for small and large prepayment users.     
5.  Concluding Discussion   
The most remarkable difference in the general pattern of charges is the one we observe between the 
two credit and the prepayment tariffs.  The coefficients of all the cost and market variables in the 
credit and direct debit equations are very similar, with the only significant differences in some of 
the constant and incumbency coefficients and the shift associated with multipart tariffs.  The 
smaller constant for direct debit reflects the lower retailing costs associated with such payment.   
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The overall fit of the prepayment equations suggests that there are some omitted variables, probably 
the effect of previous regulatory policy.    
Overall we observe that charges are much more closely related to cost factors in the standard credit  
and direct debit market.  In the prepayment market some costs are only partially passed through, 
while others appear to have no effect on the charges levied.  But the size of the market seems to 
have a much greater effect on prepayment charges than in the other markets.  This leads us to 
believe that there is more general market power in the prepayment market, where marketing is less 
aggressive and fewer consumers have switched (33% compared with 46% for the direct debit 
market, Ofgem, 2003a).  However we find little evidence that the incumbent has any additional 
market power, beyond that identified above, in the prepayment market, where their charges did not 
seem to be significantly higher than others (confirming the lack of interest by entrants in supplying 
this market).    
In contrast, the charges in the direct debit and credit markets appeared to be much more closely 
related to costs in general.  However the incumbency dummy is significant and positive in these 
markets, with the proportional mark up highest for direct debit payers with high levels of 
consumption, similar to the results in Ofgem, 2003a.  This could be interpreted as indicating some 
continuing market power of incumbents, identified in Otero and Waddams Price (2001), and in 
Giulietti et al (2003), both using earlier data.   However we note that the mark ups are higher both in 
absolute and relative terms for those payment methods where most switching has occurred, 
suggesting that caution is needed in interpreting the incumbency dummy as a direct indication of 
market power.  It may instead illustrate a disequilibrium situation with active competition from 
entrants undercutting the incumbent.  More likely we suggest that the markets are effectively 
bifurcated, with some consumers resistant to switching, so the incumbent mark-up indicates 
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exploitation of market power for these non-switchers.  This raises distributional concerns insofar as 
this part of the market generally has lower income than those who switch (Giulietti et al, 2003).
 
The smaller number of brand specific influences in prepayment (only half the number of brand 
dummies significantly different from zero, compared with other payment methods) may represent 
lackadaisical competition in prepayment, where companies use price taking as a non-competitive 
default in a market where they are obliged to offer tariffs.  Where tariffs with fixed charges have 
been replaced by tariffs with an initial high running rate, some consumers paying by credit or direct 
debit face rather higher charges, while most prepayment consumers pay less under such tariffs.  
This is further evidence that the credit market (including direct debit) is a separate market from that 
for prepayment and that consumers see the provision of prepayment as offering a distinct and 
additional service, compared with credit payment.  Across the variables we see considerable 
similarity between direct debit and standard credit tariff structures, and corresponding differences 
between them and the prepayment structure.   
   
As the final price controls were removed from retail electricity tariffs when these charges were the 
prevailing prices, the results raise important issues for future regulation of the market under the 
provisions of the Competition Act 1998.  We find evidence of both general and incumbent market 
power exercised in these markets, which suggests that the regulator needs to monitor the charges 
and their changes over time.  Incumbent mark ups in direct debit and credit markets raise concerns 
for potential exploitation of nonswitchers; and their absence, as in the prepayment market, together 
with other indications of market power, suggests a generalised market power for this payment 
method.  Ofgem s latest paper (2003a) reports that both switching rates and awareness of 
competitive possibilities are falling in this market.  There are other signs that companies intend to 
compete less fiercely.  During 2003 British Gas has reduced its sales force by half, and three of the 
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other five major suppliers have made similar moves which can be interpreted as focusing on areas 
where they are dominant, rather than fighting for new customers out of their home regions 
(energywatch, 2003).  Such announcements may be signalling such an intention to potential 
competitors, and a general agreement among companies to play a puppy dog strategy out of their 
incumbent areas (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), a ploy which is likely to be particularly easy to 
introduce and enforce through the repeated interaction of suppliers across so many regional 
markets.  In these circumstances, continuation of incumbent mark ups raises distributive concerns 
for particular groups of consumers who are less likely to switch and so gain from the competitive 
process.  This should be of particular concern to the regulator and the consumer watchdog, both of 
whom have statutory duties to take account of the needs of certain potentially vulnerable household 
categories.  Both non switchers and prepayers have lower than average income.  While the Ofgem 
report of June 2003 claims that prices are set by competitive forces, our more disaggregated 
analysis of charges indicates that substantial market power remains and the regulator needs to be 
remain alert to potential abuse, on grounds of both efficiency and equity.  Such scrutiny will help 
establish whether our results do indeed indicate cause for long term concern and surveillance, or 
disequilibrium phenomena in a market newly open to competition, where both suppliers and 
consumers have much to learn. 
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